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Abstract
We discuss four solution concepts for games with incomplete information. We show how
each solution concept can be viewed as encoding informational robustness. For a given
type space, we consider expansions of the type space that provide players with additional
signals. We distinguish between expansions along two dimensions. First, the signals can
either convey payoff relevant information or only payoff irrelevant information. Second, the
signals can be generated from a common (prior) distribution or not. We establish the
equivalence between Bayes Nash equilibrium behavior under the resulting expansion of the
type space and a corresponding more permissive solution concept under the original type
space. This approach unifies some existing literature and, in the case of an expansion
without a common prior and allowing for payoff relevant signals, leads us to a new solution
concept that we dub belief-free rationalizability.
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1 Introduction
Classical analysis of incomplete information games treats the information structure of the players
as given, and examines the consequences of some theory of rational behavior (i.e., solution con-
cept) given that information structure. But the exact information structure is often not known
to the analyst, and thus it is interesting to examine the implications of that solution concept
in all information structures that the analyst thinks possible, and thus identify predictions that
are robust to informational assumptions. In earlier work, we have examined such informational
robustness questions both in the context of mechanism design (Bergemann and Morris (2012))
and in the context of general games (Bergemann and Morris (2014)).
There is a close connection between relaxing informational assumptions and relaxing solution
concepts. Consider the solution concept of Nash equilibrium in a complete information game.
Suppose that we allow players to observe arbitrary (payoff-irrelevant) signals. If the common
prior assumption is maintained, then Aumann (1987) showed that distribution of equilibrium
behavior would correspond to an (objective) correlated equilibrium. Without the common prior
assumption, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Tan and Werlang (1988) showed that all one
can say about the resulting equilibrium behavior is that each player will choose a (correlated)
rationalizable action.
What are the incomplete information analogues of these results? Suppose now that payoffs
depend on a "payoff state" and players’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about that state are
described by a type space. But suppose that players may also observe payoff-irrelevant signals
that do not change their beliefs and higher-order beliefs about the state. Incomplete information
analogues of the complete information results are known in this setting. If the common prior
assumption is maintained, and we study (Bayes Nash) equilibria on the expanded type space with
payoff-irrelevant signals, then the distribution of equilibrium behavior corresponds to a belief
invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium (Liu (2014)). Without the common prior assumption,
all one can say about the resulting equilibrium behavior is that players will choose interim
correlated rationalizable actions (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006)). Alternative extensions
of the complete information results to incomplete information arise if we allow players to observe
payoff relevant signals, i.e., signals that refine their initial beliefs and higher-order beliefs about
the state. If the common prior assumption is maintained, and we study equilibria on the
expanded type space with payoff-relevant signals, then the distribution of equilibrium behavior
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corresponds to a Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris (2014)).
This summary of existing incomplete information results leaves one open question: what is
the implication of allowing players to observe additional payoff relevant signals without imposing
the common prior assumption? One contribution of this paper is describe a solution concept
- belief-free rationalizability - and show that an action can be played in equilibrium by a given
type who may observe extra payoff relevant signals if and only if it is belief-free rationalizable.1
Belief-free rationalizability is defined by the following iterative process that uses only the support
of a type’s beliefs, i.e., the set of profiles of other players’types and states that he thinks possible.
At each round, we delete an action for a particular type if there is no conjecture over profiles of
other players’actions and states, such that the action is a best response to the conjecture; and
the conjecture assigns zero probability to (1) profiles of the other players’actions and types that
have already been deleted; and (2) profiles of other players’types and states that are not in the
support of his original beliefs.
The following table summarizes the consequences of equilibrium under incomplete information
if we allow players to observe additional signals that may or may not be consistent with the
common prior and may or may not be payoff relevant:
payoff relevant signals payoff-irrelevant signals only
common prior Bayes correlated equilibrium belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium
non common prior belief-free rationalizability interim correlated rationalizability
In the special case of complete information (i.e., a unique payoff state), both rationalizability
results reduce to the result of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and both correlated equilibrium
results reduce to the result of Aumann (1987).
We report one example to illustrate belief-free rationalizability. Consider a two player two
action game where each player must decide whether to invest or not. There is a bad state
where it is a dominant strategy for both players to not invest. But there is also a good state
where invest is a best response for a player only if he assigns at least probability p to the other
player investing. Investment is interim correlated rationalizable in this example only if there is
common p-belief that the state is good. This also implies that the largest belief invariant Bayes
correlated equilibrium has both players investing only when there is common p-belief that the
state is good. We give a parallel characterization for belief-free rationalizability. A necessary
1We discuss the relation to the use of this name in Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo, and Penta (2011) below.
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condition for investment will be that a player thinks that it is possible that the state is good.
Another necessary condition is that a player thinks it is possible that the other player thinks
that it is possible that the state is good. And so on. Thus a necessary - and, one can also show,
suffi cient - condition for investment to be belief-free rationalizable is that there is "common
possibility" that the state is good, in the sense that all infinite sequences of such statements
are true. For an insightful equivalent characterization, say that there is iterated distributed
certainty of an event if someone is sure that the event is true, or someone is sure that someone
else is sure that the event is true, or some iteration of this statement is true. One can also show
that invest is belief-free rationalizable if and only if there is not distributed iterated certainty
that the state is bad.
All these solution concepts have simpler statements and interpretations in the special case
of "payoff type" environments, where we assume the payoff state can be represented as a profile
of player specific "payoff types", and each player is certain of his own payoff type. The payoff
type assumption corresponds to the assumption that there is "distributed certainty," i.e., the join
of players’information reveals the true state; the assumption is not without loss of generality.
But under this assumption, the "correlation" in interim correlation rationalizability is no longer
relevant, and it is equivalent to interim independent rationalizability; the belief invariant Bayes
correlated equilibrium reduces to the belief invariant Bayesian solution of Forges (2006) and
Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010); and Bayes correlated equilibrium reduces to the Bayesian
solution of Forges (1993).
Much of the literature - for one reason or another - focusses on the special case of "payofftype"
environments. This assumption is implicit in much of the literature on incomplete information
correlated equilibrium, e.g., in the solution concepts and papers cited in the previous paragraph.
A leading example of a payoff type environment is a private values environment (where a player’s
payoff depends only on his own payoff type), and Chen, Micali, and Pass (2014b) have proposed
what we are calling belief-free rationalizability in this context and used it for novel results on
robust revenue maximization in Chen, Micali, and Pass (2014a). Payoff type environments
without private values were the focus of earlier work of ours on robust mechanism design collected
in Bergemann and Morris (2012). In that work, we considered the special case where all players
believed that all payoff type profiles of other players were possible. In this special case, belief-
free rationalizability has a particularly simple characterization. For each payoff type, iteratively
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delete actions for that payoff type which are not a best response against any conjecture over
others players’actions and types that have survived the iterated deletion procedure so far. This
solution concept (with appropriate informational robustness foundations) was used in a number
of our papers on robust mechanism design (i.e., chapters 3, 4 and 7 of Bergemann and Morris
(2012)). Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo, and Penta (2011) labelled this solution concept "belief-
free rationalizability". We used Bayes correlated equilibrium (in the special case of payoff type
environments) in Bergemann and Morris (2008) (chapter 5 in Bergemann and Morris (2012)).2
A second contribution of this paper is then to tightly relate our earlier work on robust mechanism
design to our more recent work on robust predictions in games (Bergemann and Morris (2013),
(2014)).
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b) introduced the notion of "∆-rationalizability" for both
complete and incomplete information environments, building in arbitrary restrictions on the
beliefs of any type about other players’types and actions, and states. Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo,
and Penta (2011) describes how interim correlated rationalizability (in general) and belief-free
rationalizability (in the case of payofftype spaces) are special cases of "∆-rationalizability", where
particular restrictions are placed on beliefs about other players’types and states. Belief-free
rationalizability will also be a special case of∆-rationalizability, outside payofftype environments,
where the corresponding type dependent restriction on beliefs would be on the support of beliefs
only.
We framed the complete information results of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Aumann
(1987) as "informational robustness" results, i.e., what happens to equilibrium predictions if we
allow players to observe additional (payoff-irrelevant) signals, and this corresponds to the formal
statements of their results.3 However, both papers interpret their results informally as establish-
ing the implications of common certainty of rationality,4 and the later "epistemic foundations"
2Thus the application of the solution concepts in the results in this paper to payoff type environments subsumes
results we reported in our unpublished paper on "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games" (Bergemann and
Morris (2007)).
3Thus Proposition 2.1 of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), while stated in the language of interim payoffs,
established that the set of actions played in an appropriate version of subjective correlated equilibrium were equal
to the correlated rationalizable actions. The main theorem of Aumann (1987) showed that under assumptions
equivalent to Bayes Nash equilibrium on a common prior type space with payoff-irrelevant signals, the ex ante
distribution of play corresponds to an (objective) correlated equilibrium.
4Aumann (1987) notes in the introduction that he assumes "common knowledge that each player chooses a
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literature presents more formal statements of these results as consequence of common certainty of
rationality.5 We also discuss how our "informational robustness" results can be translated back
into "epistemic foundations" results, justifying solution concepts from primitive epistemic as-
sumptions. However, our epistemic foundations results are in the spirit of the classical literature
and we do not address issues that have been the focus of much recent literature, i.e., removing ref-
erence to players’beliefs about their own types (Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)), restricting
attention to state spaces that reflect "expressible" statements about the model (Brandenburger
and Friedenberg (2008) and Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo, and Penta (2011)), and giving an in-
terim interpretation of the common prior results (Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014)). The focus of
our discussion of epistemic foundations is showing how the informational robustness results we
discuss map into the modern epistemic foundations literature, without attempting a treatment
of the topics of interest in that literature.
We discuss the four solution concepts in section 2 and the coordination example in section 3.
In section 4, we report how the solution concepts specialize to complete information rationaliz-
ability and correlated equilibrium in the case of complete information games, and widely used
and simpler solution concepts in the case of payoff type environments. Informational robustness
foundations of the solution concepts are reported in section 5; their translation to (old fashioned)
epistemic foundation results and their relation to the (modern) epistemic foundations literature
are discussed in section 6.
strategy that maximizes his expected utility given his information". Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) write in
the introduction that their approach "starts from the assumption that the rationality of the players is common
knowledge." We follow the recent literature in replacing the term "knowledge" in the expression common knowl-
edge because it corresponds to "belief with probability 1," rather than "true belief" (the meaning of knowledge
in philosophy and general discourse). We use "certainty" to mean "belief with probability 1".
5Thus Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014) state a modern version of the main result of Brandenburger and Dekel
(1987) as Theorem 1 and a (somewhat) more modern statement of Aumann (1987) in section 4.6.2.
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2 Four Classical Solution Concepts
We will fix a finite set of players 1, ..., I and a finite set of payoff relevant states Θ.
We divide a standard description of an incomplete information game into a "basic game" and
a "type space". A basic game G = (Ai, ui)Ii=1 consists of, for each player, a finite set of possible
actions Ai and a payoff function ui : A × Θ → R where A = A1 × ... × AI .6 A type space
T = (Ti, πi)Ii=1 consists of, for each player, a finite set of types, Ti and, for each of his types,
a belief over the others players’types and the state, πi : Ti → ∆ (T−i ×Θ). An incomplete
information game consists of a basic game G = (Ai, ui)Ii=1 and a type space T = (Ti, πi)
I
i=1; this
is the standard description modulo the fact that the common prior assumption is not maintained.
We begin by discussing "classical solution concepts" for the fixed incomplete information game
(G, T ), meaning that we define solution concepts without referring to informational robustness
(or epistemic) foundations.
We consider two alternative definitions of rationalizability in game (G, T ). First consider
interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007)). An action is interim
correlated rationalizable for a type ti if we iteratively delete actions which are not a best response
to any supporting conjecture over other players’actions and types, as well as states, which (1)
puts probability 1 on action type profiles which have survived the iterated deletion procedure
so far, and (2) has a marginal belief over others’types and states which is consistent with that
type’s beliefs on the type space. Crucially, this definition allows arbitrary correlation in the
supporting conjecture as long as (1) and (2) are satisfied. Formally, let ICR0i (ti) = Ai and let
ICRn+1i (ti) equal the set of actions for which there exists νi ∈ ∆ (A−i × T−i ×Θ) such that




νi (a−i, t−i, θ) = πi (t−i, θ|ti) for each t−i, θ;




νi (a−i, t−i, θ)ui ((a
′






6In Bergemann and Morris (2014) we included a common prior on states in the description of the basic game.
Because we are relaxing the common prior assumption, it is convenient to use a slightly different definition in this
paper.
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Definition 1 (Interim Correlated Rationalizable)
Action ai is interim correlated rationalizable for type ti (in game (G, T )) if ai ∈ ICRi (ti).
Now consider a more permissive rationalizability notion, belief-free rationalizability. The
definition is the same as iterated correlated rationalizability except that we relax assumption (2)
to the requirement that the rationalizing conjecture be consistent with the player’s belief on the
type space to the weaker requirement that its support is a subset of the player’s belief on the
type space. Thus we have BFR0i (ti) = Ai and let BFR
n+1
i (ti) equal the set of actions for which
there exists νi ∈ ∆ (T−i × A−i ×Θ) s.t.




νi (a−i, t−i, θ) > 0⇒ πi (t−i, θ|ti) > 0 for each t−i, θ;




νi (a−i, t−i, θ)ui ((a
′






Definition 2 (Belief-Free Rationalizable)
Action ai is belief-free rationalizable for type ti (in game (G, T )) if ai ∈ BFRi (ti).
Note that this definition is independent of a type’s quantized beliefs and depends only on
which profiles of other players’types and states he considers possible, i.e., the support of his
beliefs.
We now consider two parallel definitions of (objective) incomplete information correlated
equilibrium for the same incomplete information game. Type space T = (Ti, πi)Ii=1 satisfies the












for all i and ti, and
πi (t−i, θ|ti) =
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for all i, (ti, t−i) and θ.7
Now we have a common prior incomplete information game (G, T ). Behavior in this incom-
plete information game can be described by a decision rule mapping players’types and states to
a probability distribution over players’actions, σ : T × Θ → ∆ (A). A decision rule σ satisfies
belief invariance if, for each player i,
σi (ai| (ti, t−i) , θ) ,
∑
a−i
σi ((ai, a−i) | (ti, t−i) , θ)
is independent of (t−i, θ). Thus a decision rule satisfies belief invariance if a player’s action
recommendation does not reveal any additional information to him about others’types and the
state. This property has played an important role in the literature on incomplete information
correlated equilibrium, see, Forges (1993), Forges (2006) and Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya
(2010). Notice that property (2) in the iterative definition of interim correlated rationalizability
was a belief invariance assumption.
Decision rule σ satisfies obedience if∑
a−i,t−i,θ




π∗ (ti, t−i)σ ((ai, a−i) | (ti, t−i) , θ)ui ((a′i, a−i) , θ) .
for all i, ti ∈ Ti and ai, a′i ∈ Ai. Obedience has the following mediator interpretation. Suppose
that an omniscient mediator knew players’types and the true state, randomly selected an action
profile according to σ and privately informed each player of his recommended action. Would a
player who knew his own type and heard the mediator’s recommendation have an incentive to
follow the recommendation? Obedience says that he would want to follow the recommendation.
Definition 3 (Belief Invariant Bayes Correlated Equilibrium)
Decision rule σ is a belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium if it satisfies obedience and belief
invariance.
7When the common prior assumption is maintained, we understand the common prior π∗ to be implicitly
defined by the type space. In the (special) case where multiple common priors satisfy the above properties,
our results will hold true for any choice of common prior. By requiring that all types are assigned positive
probability, we are making a slightly stronger assumption than some formulations of results in the literature.
This version simplifies the statement of results and will also tie in with the support assumption that we impose
in the informational robustness foundations in Section 5.
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Liu (2014) described the subjective correlated equilibrium analogue of interim correlated
rationalizability. If one then imposes the common prior assumption (as he discusses in section
5.3), this is the version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium one obtains. Its relation
to the incomplete information correlated equilibrium literature is further discussed in Bergemann
and Morris (2014): it is in general a weaker requirement than the belief invariant Bayesian
solution of Forges (2006) and Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010), because - like interim
correlated rationalizability - it allows unexplained correlation between types and payoff states.
It is immediate from definitions that any action played with positive probability by a type in a
belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium is interim correlated rationalizable.
Definition 4 (Bayes Correlated Equilibrium)
Decision rule σ is a Bayes correlated equilibrium if it satisfies obedience.
This solution concept is studied in Bergemann and Morris (2014). It is immediate from
definitions that any action played with positive probability by a type in a belief invariant Bayes
correlated equilibrium is belief-free rationalizable.
3 Binary Action Coordination Games
The solution concepts can be illustrated by a classic binary action coordination game. There
are two states, "good" (G) and "bad" (B), so Θ = {θG, θB}. There are two actions, Invest and
Not Invest. Payoffs are given by the following matrices:
θB Invest Not Invest
Invest −1,−1 −1, 0
Not Invest 0,−1 0, 0





− 1 −1, 0
Not Invest 0,−1 0, 0
where 0 < p < 1. Thus there is a dominant strategy to not invest in the bad state. There are
two strict Nash equilibria in the good state. If there is common certainty that the state is good,
invest is a best response for a player if and only if he thinks the other player will invest with
probability at least p.
We will characterize rationalizable behavior (for the two versions given above) on all type
spaces using belief operators. For the fixed type space, an event E is a subset of T×Θ. Following
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Monderer and Samet (1989), we define belief operators as follows. Write Bpi (E) for set of types




∣∣πi ({(t′−i, θ′) | ((ti, t′−i) , θ′) ∈ E} |ti) ≥ p} .
Also define everyone p-believes and common p-belief operators which map events in T × Θ to












Write EG and EB for the set of states where the payoff state θ is good and bad respectively, so
EG = {(t, θ) |θ = θG} and EB = {(t, θ) |θ = θB } .
Now action "not invest" is always interim correlated rationalizable. Action "invest" is interim
correlated rationalizable for type ti of player i only if he p-believes that it is common p-belief
that the state is good, i.e., if ti ∈ Bpi (Cp (EG)). This is a well known characterization.8
Now write B+i (E) for the set of types of player i that think that E is possible:
B+i (E) =
ti ∈ Ti
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∃t−i ∈ T−i and θ ∈ Θ such that((ti, t−i) , θ) ∈ E and πi (t−i, θ|ti) > 0
 = ∩p>0Bpi (E)















Action "not invest" is always belief-free rationalizable. Action "invest" is belief-free rationaliz-
able for type ti of player i exactly if he thinks it is possible that there is common possibility that
the state is good, i.e., if ti ∈ B+i (C+ (EG)). Is this a strong or a weak condition? It is weak in
the sense that, at each level, only possibility is required. It is strong in the sense that we still
need infinite levels (or a fixed point) to support investment.
To further understand this characterization, note that an event is possible for a player exactly
if he is certain of (i.e., assigns probability 1 to) its complement. Thus writing ∼ E for the
complement of event E, we have
B+i (E) =∼ B1i (∼ E) .
8See Monderer and Samet (1989) and Kajii and Morris (1997).
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Now suppose that we define an operator B1∗∗ (E) corresponding to distributed certainty that E




∣∣ti ∈ B1i (E) for some i}
and say that there is iterated distributed certainty of event E if there is distributed certainty
of E, or there is distributed certainty that there is distributed certainty, or a further iterated
version of this statement is true. Thus







B+∗ (E) =∼ B1∗∗ (∼ E) .









C+ (E) =∼ C1∗∗ (∼ E) .
Thus there is common possibility of event E if and only if there is not iterated distributed
certainty of not E. Thus invest is belief-free rationalizable if and only if there is not iterated
distributed certainty that the state is bad (i.e., θB).
We can also characterize belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibria in this game. There is
clearly a belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium where each player i invests if he p-believes
that there is common p-belief of the good state, i.e., type ti invests whenever ti ∈ Bpi (Cp (EG)).
Action "invest" is not interim correlated rationalizable for player i if ti /∈ Bpi (Cp (EG)). Thus
the "largest" belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium has players investing only on the
event Cp (EG). The structure of Bayes correlated equilibria is more subtle in this example; see
Bergemann and Morris (2014) for a discussion of the structure of Bayes correlated equilibria in
related contexts.
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4 Two Important Special Cases
4.1 Complete Information
If Θ is a singleton, then interim correlated rationalizability and belief-free rationalizability will
both reduce to (complete information) correlated rationalizability (Brandenburger and Dekel
(1987)); and belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium and Bayes correlated equilibrium reduce
to complete information (objective) correlated equilibrium (Aumann (1987)). In this sense, we
are looking at natural generalizations of the classical complete information literature results (at
least when they are given an "informational robustness" interpretation).
4.2 PayoffType Spaces
Consider the special case where the payoff relevant states have a product structure, i.e.,
Θ = Θ1 ×Θ2 × ....×ΘI
and each player knows his own "payoff type" θi ∈ Θi, and nothing more. Thus we have Ti = Θi.
This "naive" or "payoff" type space is a particular example of a type space as used in the
preceding analysis. On this space, beliefs will reduce to πi : Θi → ∆ (Θ−i).
The definition of interim correlated rationalizability reduces as follows. Let ICR0i (θi) = Ai
and let ICRn+1i (θi) equal the set of actions for which there exists νi ∈ ∆ (A−i ×Θ−i) such that




νi (a−i, θ−i) = πi (θ−i|θi) for each θ




νi (a−i, θ−i, )ui ((a
′






In a payoff type environment, allowing correlation between others’types and payoff states makes
no difference here, and this version of interim rationalizability has been widely used in (explicit
or implicit) payoff type environments (for example, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003a) and Dekel
and Wolinsky (2003)).
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Belief-free rationalizability will now be defined as follows. Let BFE0i (θi) = Ai and let
BFEn+1i (θi) equal the set of actions for which there exists ν ∈ ∆ (A−i ×Θ−i) such that




ν (a−i, θ−i, ) > 0⇒ πi (θ−i|θi) > 0




ν (a−i, θ−i)ui ((a
′






A decision rule will now be a mapping σ : Θ→ A and will be obedient if∑
a−i,θ−i




π∗ (θi, θ−i)σ ((ai, a−i) | (θi, θ−i))ui ((a′i, a−i) , (θi, θ−i)) .
for all i, θi ∈ Θi, and ai, a′i ∈ Ai; and belief invariant if
σi (ai| (θi, θ−i)) ,
∑
a−i
σi ((ai, a−i) | (θi, θ−i))
is independent of θ−i. In this case, Bayes correlated equilibrium reduces to the Bayesian solution
of Forges (1993) and the belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium reduces to belief invariant
Bayesian solution of Forges (2006) and Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010).
Within payofftype spaces, we can consider two further restrictions in order to relate belief-free
rationalizability to existing approaches:
1. There are private values if ui ((ai, a−i) , (θi, θ−i)) is independent of θ−i. Under the private
values assumption, the solution concept of belief-free rationalizability is that studied by
Chen, Micali, and Pass (2014b); Chen, Micali, and Pass (2014a) develop novel results about
robust revenue maximization using this solution concept.
2. The full (payoff type) support assumption is satisfied if πi (θ−i|θi) > 0 for all i, θi and
θ−i. Under the full support assumption, restriction (2) in the definition of belief-free
rationalizability becomes redundant. We referred to this as "incomplete information ra-
tionalizability" in Bergemann and Morris (2008). This is the solution concept analyzed in
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much of our mechanism design work (Bergemann and Morris (2012)). Note that we did
not report beliefs over payoff types in our robust mechanism design work, but if we had,
they would be irrelevant to our analysis and we were implicitly assuming full support by
always allowing any payoff type profile of others to be associated with a given payoff type
of a player. We studied Bayes correlated equilibrium in this context in Bergemann and
Morris (2008) where we called it "incomplete information correlated equilibrium".
5 Informational Robustness Foundations of Four Solution
Concepts
Now suppose that we start out with type space T and we allow each player i to observe an
additional signal si ∈ Si. Each player i has a subjective belief φi about the distribution of
signals conditional on the type profiles and the payoff state:
φi : T ×Θ→ ∆ (S) .
5.1 Subjective Belief and the Support Assumption
We make the support assumption that, for all players i and ti ∈ Ti, there exists Si (ti) ⊆ Si such
that ∑
s−i,t−i,θ
φi ((si, s−i) | (ti, t−i) , θ)πi (t−i, θ|ti) > 0 (1)
for each si ∈ Si (ti) and
φj ((si, s−i) |t, θ) = 0 (2)
for all j 6= i, si /∈ Si (ti), s−i, t and θ. The interpretation is that if player i has type ti, there is
common certainty that he will observe an additional signal si ∈ Si (ti) and player i thinks that
every signal in Si (ti) is possible. This support assumption ensures that whenever a player other
than i thinks that (ti, si) is possible, the beliefs of player i conditional on (ti, si) are well-defined
by Bayes rule. This assumption was implicit in the formulation of a correlating device in Liu
(2014). We briefly discuss in section 5.2 alternative ways of addressing this issue. We refer to
any (Si, φi)
I
i=1 satisfying the support restriction as an expansion of type space T . An expansion
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is payoff-irrelevant if, for each player i,∑
s−i∈S−i
φi ((si, s−i) | (ti, t−i) , θ) (3)
is independent of (t−i, θ). Liu (2014) has shown that this definition characterizes payoff irrele-
vance in the sense that players can observe signals without altering their beliefs and higher-order
beliefs about the state (see also Bergemann and Morris (2014)). Now a basic game G, a type
space T and an expansion (Si, φi)
I
i=1 jointly define a game of incomplete information. A (pure)
strategy for player i in this game of incomplete information is a mapping βi : Ti × Si → Ai.9
Now strategy profile β is a (Bayes Nash) equilibrium if, for each player i, ti and si ∈ Si (ti), we
have ∑
t−i,s−i,θ
πi (t−i, θ|ti)φi (si, s−i| ((ti, t−i) , θ))ui
((








πi (t−i, θ|ti)φi (si, s−i| ((ti, t−i) , θ))ui
((




for all ai ∈ Ai.
Now we have informational robustness foundations for the two rationalizability solution con-
cepts we discussed:
Proposition 1 Action ai is interim correlated rationalizable for type ti of player i in (G, T )












and a signal si ∈ Si (ti) such that βi (ti, si) = ai.
Versions of this observation appear as Proposition 2 in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006)
and as Lemma 2 in Liu (2014). For completeness, and for comparison with the next Propo-
sition, we report a proof in the Appendix for the Proposition under the current notation and
interpretation.
Proposition 2 Action ai is belief-free rationalizable for type ti of player i in (G, T ) if and only














si ∈ Si (ti) such that βi (ti, si) = ai.
9 It is without loss of generality to focus on pure strategy profiles for our results: if mixed strategies were
allowed, they could always be purified with a richer expansion.
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Proof. Suppose that action ai is belief-free rationalizable for type ti in (G, T ). By the
definition of belief-free rationalizability, there exists, for each aj ∈ BFRj (tj), a conjecture νaj ,tjj ∈
∆ (T−j × A−j ×Θ) such that






j (t−j, a−j, θ) > 0⇒ πj (t−j, θ|tj) > 0 for each t−j, θ; and






















and φj : T × Θ→ ∆ (S) is
given by






j (t−j, s−j, θ) , if sj ∈ BFRj (tj) and s−j ∈ BFR−j (t−j)





j (t−j, s−j, θ) , if sj = s
∗




for some ε > 0. It is always possible to construct such an expansion for suffi ciently small













can be arbitrarily set





























. We will show inductively in n that, for all players j, aj ∈ BFRnj (tj)
whenever sj ∈ Sj (tj) and βj (tj, sj) = aj. It is true by construction for n = 0. Suppose that
it is true for n. Since sj ∈ Sj (tj), equilibrium condition (4) implies that aj is a best response
to a conjecture over others’types and actions and the state. By the inductive hypothesis, this
conjecture assigns zero probability to type action profiles (tj, aj) of player j where aj /∈ BFRnj (tj).
By construction, the marginal of this conjecture on T−j×Θ has support contained in the support
of πj (·|tj). Thus aj ∈ BFRn+1j (tj).
An expansion (Si, φi)
I
i=1 satisfies the common prior assumption if φi is independent of i. An
expanded game
(




and a strategy profile β for that game will induce a decision
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rule σ : T ×Θ→ ∆ (A):
σ (a|t, θ) =
∑
{(t,s):β(t,s)=a}
φ (s| (t, θ)) .
Proposition 3 If T is a common prior type space, then σ is a belief invariant Bayes correlated
equilibrium of (G, T ) if and only if there exists a payoff-irrelevant common prior expansion
(Si, φi)
I
i=1 of T and equilibrium β of
(




such that β induces σ.
Proposition 4 If T is a common prior type space, then σ is a Bayes correlated equilibrium of
(G, T ) if and only if there exists a common prior expansion (Si, φi)
I
i=1 of T and equilibrium β of(




such that β induces σ.
A subjective version of Proposition 3 appears in Liu (2014) (and the common prior case is
discussed in section 5.3). Proposition 4 appears as Theorem 2 in Bergemann and Morris (2014).
5.2 The Support Assumption and a Posteriori Equilibrium
In our definitions of expansions, we maintained the support assumption (see equations (1) and
(2) above). This assumption is automatically satisfied under the common prior assumption.
But what is the significance of the support assumption for rationalizability results? If we simply
dropped the assumption, and did not replace it with any restriction, then any action could be
played in an equilibrium on some expansion of the type space, since it does not matter for ex ante
utility what action is played on a zero probability event. An intermediate assumption would be
to drop the support assumption, but to add to equilibrium condition (4) the requirement that
an action was a best response to some conjecture at signals that were assigned probability zero,
i.e., if ∑
s−i,t−i,θ
φi ((si, s−i) | (ti, t−i) , θ) πi (t−i, θ|ti) = 0, (5)
then there exists νi ∈ ∆ (T−i × S−i ×Θ) such that∑
t−i,s−i,θ
νi (t−i, s−i, θ)ui
((








νi (t−i, s−i, θ)ui
((




for all ai ∈ Ai. But if we relaxed the support assumption to this intermediate assumption, the
resulting solution concept would no longer depend on the type space. In particular, say that
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an action is ex post rationalizable in basic game G if it survives an iterative deletion procedure
where, at each round, we delete actions which are not a best response given any conjecture over
surviving actions. Formally, let EPR0i = Ai, let EPR
n+1
i be the set of actions for which there
exists νi ∈ ∆ (A−i ×Θ) s.t.
(1) νi (a−i, θ) > 0⇒ aj ∈ EPRnj for each j 6= i,




νi (a−i, θ)ui ((a
′






So an action could be played in an expanded type space (whether or not (3) is satisfied) if
and only if it is ex post rationalizable. Because the solution concept no longer depends on the
type space, we would have some counter-intuitive implications. Consider a payoff type space
with private values, so that a player has a payoff type determining his private value on the
original type space. But because he observes a zero probability signal, we must allow him to
have any belief after observing unexpected signals, so he can conclude that his prior belief about
his private value was wrong. Our support assumption exactly rules out the possibility of players
observing zero probability signals and updating to beliefs outside their original support.
Interim correlated rationalizability, belief-free rationalizability and ex post rationalizability
all reduce to correlated rationalizability in complete information games. In fact, in the complete
information case, allowing players to assign zero probability to signals but requiring them to play
best responses to some conjecture is exactly the refinement of subjective correlated equilibrium,
a posteriori equilibrium, introduced in Aumann (1974) and used in Brandenburger and Dekel
(1987). If we wanted to stay closer to the language of Aumann (1974) and Brandenburger and
Dekel (1987), we could define a generalized, incomplete information, version of a posteriori equi-
librium. If one imposed no new restrictions given the initial type space, we would characterize
ex post rationalizability; by imposing additional restrictions at zero probability events, we would
get back to belief-free rationalizability and interim correlated rationalizability.
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6 Epistemic Foundations of Four Solution Concepts
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, we sketch how the "informational robustness"
Propositions 1 through 4 of the previous section can be mechanically re-interpreted as classic
epistemic results in the spirit of the classic works of Aumann (1987) and Brandenburger and
Dekel (1987). Then, we discuss the limitations of these crude translations of our results in
the light of the modern epistemic foundations literature. Our purpose in doing so is not to
provide novel epistemic foundations results but rather to see how some solution concepts that
we and others have worked with in economic applications, and their informational robustness
foundations, relate to the epistemic foundations literature.
6.1 Epistemic Type Spaces
We fix a basic game G = (Ai, ui)Ii=1 which will implicitly be assumed to be commonly certain
among the players. Let each player have a finite set of types Ωi. The state space is thus Ω×Θ.
A type ωi ∈ Ωi includes a description of the player’s action, given by αi : Ωi → Ai. Let Ti
be a finite set and let τ i : Ωi → Ti. The interpretation is that ti ∈ Ti is an arbitrary partial
description of player i’s type. Each player has a belief ψi : Ti → ∆ (Ω×Θ) satisfying∑
ω−i,θ
ψi (((ωi, ω−i) , θ) |ti) = 0
whenever τ i (ωi) 6= ti and ∑
ω−i,θ
ψi (((ωi, ω−i) , θ) |ti) > 0
whenever τ i (ωi) = ti. We will refer to E = (Ωi, αi, Ti, τ i, ψi)
I
i=1 as an epistemic type space.
For a given epistemic type space, we describe some objects of interest. Let ψ̂i : Ωi →
∆ (Ω−i ×Θ) be the induced belief of type ωi of player i over other players’types and the state:
ψ̂i (ω−i, θ|ωi) =











An epistemic type space also induces beliefs about partial descriptions of others’types, πi : Ti →
∆ (T−i ×Θ), where
πi (t−i, θ|ti) =
∑
{ω|τ(ω)=t},θ
ψi (((ωi, ω−i) , θ) |ti) .
Informational Robustness December 15, 2014 21




∣∣∣ψ̂i (ω−i, θ|ωi) > 0⇒ ((ωi, ω−i) , θ) ∈ E} .
Let C∗ (E) be the event where all players are certain of E, so
C (E) = {(ω, θ) ∈ Ω×Θ |ωi ∈ Ci (E) for each i} .





Let Rati be the set of player i’s types that are rational:
Rati =
ωi ∈ Ωi
∣∣∣∣∣∣αi (ωi) ∈ arg maxai
∑
ω−i,θ
ψ̂i (ω−i, θ|ωi)ui ((ai, α−i (ω−i)) , θ)
 .
Let Rat be the event where all players are rational, so
Rat = {(ω, θ) ∈ Ω×Θ|ωi ∈ Rati for each i} .
We now want to discuss players’beliefs and higher-order beliefs about the states Θ. We
omit the - by now, standard - construction of this space, following Mertens and Zamir (1985)
and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993). This (infinite) space T ∗∗ satisfies the homeomorphism




. Now there is a bijection between T ∗∗ and the set of all beliefs and
higher-order beliefs about Θ. We are restricting attention to finite type spaces. Thus we write
T ∗ for the set of types in T ∗∗ that belong to a belief closed subset of T ∗∗. We refer to an element
of t∗ ∈ T ∗ as a Θ-type, since it is a canonical description of the beliefs and higher-order beliefs
of a finite type about Θ.
Now any type ωi ∈ Ωi implicitly defines beliefs and higher-order beliefs about Θ. Let the
mapping γi : Ωi → T ∗ describe the beliefs and higher-order beliefs of player i. We will say
that γi (ωi) is the Θ-type of type ωi. We also defined a partial description of a player’s type,
ti ∈ Ti and an associated belief about other players’partial types and states. Now partial type
ti ∈ Ti also implicitly defines beliefs and higher-order beliefs about Θ, specifying beliefs about
Θ conditional on type ti alone, beliefs about beliefs of others conditional on T−i alone, and Θ,
conditional on ti; and so on. Let the mapping ξi : Ti → T ∗ describe the beliefs and higher-order
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beliefs of player i based on partial information. We will say that ξi (τ i (ωi)) is the partial Θ-type
of type ωi.
Finally, recall that we defined solution concepts on arbitrary types spaces. But each of
the four solution concepts we have discussed have the property that they are independent of
redundant types. Thus if we write T ∗ for the type space consisting of I copies of T ∗ and




, the set of belief-free rationalizable and interim correlated
rationalizable actions of a Θ-type of player i in game (G, T ∗) are well-defined. And the set of
BIBCE and BCE decision rules defined on finite belief-closed subsets of (T ∗)I ×Θ are also well
defined.
Now we have the following re-statements of the four informational robustness Propositions
above:
Proposition 5 If there is common certainty of rationality, then all players are choosing interim
correlated rationalizable actions for their Θ-type; i.e.,
(ω, θ) ∈ CC (Rat)⇒ αi (ωi) ∈ ICRi (γi (ωi)) .
Conversely, if an action is interim correlated rationalizable for a Θ-type of player i, then there
exists an epistemic type space and a type of player i in that epistemic type space who takes that
action, has that Θ-type and is certain that there is common certainty of rationality; i.e.,
ai ∈ ICRi (t∗)⇒ ∃E and ωi ∈ Ωi such that αi (ωi) = ai, γi (ωi) = t∗ and ωi ∈ Ci (CC (Rat)) .
Various "epistemic foundations" of interim correlated equilibrium have been presented in the
literature (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo, and Penta (2011)
and Liu (2014)). The above statement is closest to that of Theorem 11 of Dekel and Siniscalchi
(2014).
Proposition 6 If there is common certainty of rationality, then all players are choosing belief-
free rationalizable actions for their partial Θ-type; i.e.,
(ω, θ) ∈ CC (Rat)⇒ αi (ωi) ∈ BFRi (ξi (τ i (ωi))) .
Conversely, if an action is belief-free rationalizable for a Θ-type of player i, then there exists an
epistemic type space and a type of player i in that epistemic type space who takes that action,
has that partial Θ-type and is certain that there is common certainty of rationality; i.e.,
ai ∈ BFEi (t∗)⇒ ∃E and ωi ∈ Ωi such that αi (ωi) = ai, ξi (τ i (ωi)) = t∗ and ωi ∈ Ci (CC (Rat)) .
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An epistemic type space E = (Ωi, αi, Ti, τ i, ψi)
I
i=1 satisfies the common prior assumption if
there exists a common prior













for all i and ωi, and
ψi ((ωi, ω−i) , θ) = 0
ψi (((ωi, ω−i) , θ) |τ i (ωi)) =










for all i, (ωi, ω−i) and θ.
Proposition 7 For any common prior epistemic type space, the implied decision rule as a func-
tion of Θ-types and states, conditional on common certainty of rationality, is a belief invariant
Bayes correlated equilibrium. Conversely, for any belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium,
there exists a common prior epistemic type space where there is common certainty of rational-
ity and the implied decision rule as a function of Θ-types and states, conditional on common
certainty of rationality equals that belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium.
Proposition 8 For any common prior epistemic type space, the implied decision rule as a func-
tion of Θ-types and states, conditional on common certainty of rationality, is a Bayes correlated
equilibrium. Conversely, for any Bayes correlated equilibrium, there exists a common prior epis-
temic type space where there is common certainty of rationality and the implied decision rule as
a function of partial Θ-types and states, conditional on common certainty of rationality, equals
that Bayes correlated equilibrium.
Propositions 5 through 8 are re-writings of Propositions 1 through 4, with (i) different in-
terpretations of the underlying objects; and (ii) restricting attention to type spaces without
redundant types.
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6.2 Discussion
Let us discuss a few of the ways in which these results are "old fashioned" and/or problematic.
1. As in the classical literature, we allowed players to hold beliefs about their own types,
i.e., their actions and their rationality. Following Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), we
could remove references to agents’beliefs over their own types. It would certainly imply
changes in language and, in some cases, such as in the incomplete information extensions of
the correlated equilibrium results of Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014), this would lead to novel
conceptual issues.
2. We assumed that player i has a belief conditional on his partial type ti and that, conditional
on type ti alone, he assigns strictly positive probability to every ωi with τ i (ωi) = ti. What
does this belief mean? One interpretation is that it is a counterfactual belief: what player
i would believe if he only remembered τ i (ωi) = ti and did not remember his true type.
For most of our analysis, this assumption does not matter and we could have been working
directly with ψ̂i : Ωi → ∆ (Ω−i ×Θ). But the assumption does matter for Proposition
6. We could work with alternative assumptions. We need to somehow associate a partial
type ti with a hierarchical belief type, but (for purposes of Proposition 6) we could define
πi : Ti → ∆ (T−i ×Θ) arbitrarily as long as ψi (ω−i, θ|ωi) ⇒ ψi (τ−i (ω−i) , θ|τ i (ωi)) > 0.
But Proposition 6 is perhaps the weakest epistemic foundations result to the extent that
we are not comfortable with the interpretation of the belief ψi : Ti → ∆ (Ω×Θ).
3. We did not impose structure on the epistemic type space and thus allowed distinctions be-
tween states which did not correspond to well defined statements in the model about beliefs
and higher-order beliefs about exogenous and endogenous variables. Recent works have
argued that we should not allow such distinctions; thus Brandenburger and Friedenberg
(2008) argue that "extrinsic uncertainty" should not be allowed and Battigalli, Di Tillio,
Grillo, and Penta (2011) argue that only events corresponding to "expressible" statements
should be allowed. Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008) argue that - in the context of
complete information games - excluding extrinsic uncertainty leads to a slight refinement of
correlated rationalizability as the characterization of the implications of common certainty
of rationality. Presumably, their approach could be extended to incomplete information
and this would similarly refine interim correlated rationalizability. Battigalli, Di Tillio,
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Grillo, and Penta (2011) instead enrich the language, by adding explicit signals, to make
more statements expressible in the language, and provide expressible epistemic foundations
for interim correlated rationalizability.
4. Propositions 7 and 8, like Aumann (1987), show that common certainty of rationality im-
plies the play of a correlated equilibrium. But these results prove implications of common
certainty of rationality under the common prior. Thus they rely on an ex ante interpre-
tation of the prior. But epistemic models are usual assumed to be about interim beliefs,
and since Aumann (1987), we have elegant characterizations of what it means for a partic-
ular type to have beliefs and higher-order beliefs consistent with the common prior (Samet
(1998) and Feinberg (2000)). Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014) report an alternative epistemic
foundation for correlated equilibrium - in the context of incomplete information games -
which takes an interim perspective and avoids discussing a player’s belief about his own
action. One could presumably extend their approach to incomplete information to give
epistemic foundations for belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that action ai is interim correlated rationalizable for type ti
in (G, T ). By the definition of interim correlated rationalizability, there exists, for each player
j and aj ∈ ICRj (tj), a conjecture νaj ,tjj ∈ ∆ (T−j × A−j ×Θ) s.t.






j (t−j, a−j, θ) = πj (t−j, θ|tj) for each t−j, θ; and


















of T , where Sj = Aj and φj : T ×Θ→ ∆ (S) satisfies




j (t−j ,a−j ,θ)
πj(t−j ,θ|tj)·#ICRj(tj) , if a ∈ ICR (t) ,
0 if otherwise;







βj (tj, aj) = aj
for all j, tj and aj ∈ ICRj (tj).











). We will show inductively in n that, for all players j, aj ∈ ICRnj (tj) whenever
βj (tj, sj) = aj for some sj ∈ Sj (tj). It is true by construction for n = 0. Suppose that it
is true for n. Equilibrium condition (4) implies that aj is a best response to a conjecture over
others’types and actions and the state. By the inductive hypothesis, this conjecture assigns zero
probability to type action profile (tk, ak) of player k 6= j with ak /∈ ICRnk (tk). By construction,
the marginal on T−j ×Θ is equal to πj (·|tj). Thus aj ∈ ICRn+1j (tj).
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